Optimizely attack: what it means for the third-party scripts on your website

19th November 2026NewsAJ Thompson

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On 16 November 2026, attackers used Optimizely, a widely used website testing and personalisation tool, to serve malicious code to visitors of 178 organisations’ websites, including the BBC, HSBC, Zoom and Salesforce. None of those websites was hacked directly. The code arrived through a script each site had chosen to trust.

For any organisation that runs third-party scripts on its website, and most do, the lesson is to know which scripts you load, who can change them and what your browser defences would stop.

What happened?

Optimizely’s web experimentation product works by loading a JavaScript file from Optimizely’s servers on every page of a customer’s website. Optimizely told BleepingComputer that an unauthorised party exploited a vulnerability in its Experimentation account signup flow and used it to add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects.

Security researcher Scott Helme and his team at Report URI uncovered the attack. They examined 1,611 Optimizely scripts and found 188 infected files belonging to 178 organisations, including UK names such as the BBC, Equifax UK, Virgin Media O2, Admiral and TalkTalk. The first injection they saw was at 04:21 UTC on 16 November.

Because the code was served from Optimizely’s own trusted servers, browsers treated it as genuine. Optimizely says it has fixed the vulnerability, removed the injected code, revoked access tokens and notified affected customers, with updates on its status page. By 21:52 UTC that day, only one of the 188 infected files still carried the code.

Northdoor branded graphic on a dark slate background with pink accents, carrying the line A trusted script can still deliver untrusted code.

What did the malicious code do?

According to Report URI’s analysis, the code was a theft toolkit that ran in visitors’ browsers. It:

  • swapped cryptocurrency wallet addresses for the attackers’ own, diverting payments
  • captured card details typed into a website’s own payment forms, although cards entered in hosted payment fields such as Stripe’s were out of its reach
  • collected cookies, page addresses and screenshots
  • tried to install exploit kits on iPhones and iPads running older versions of iOS

Report URI found that a Content Security Policy, a browser setting that limits which scripts can run and where a page can send data, made the difference. Of the affected organisations it checked, 68 had no policy at all and 50 had one that let the attack run. Only 24 blocked it.

What Northdoor says

AJ Thompson, Chief Commercial Officer at Northdoor, said:

“This attack didn’t need to break into a single one of the websites it affected. It came in through a tool those websites had already chosen to trust. Most organisations load scripts from analytics, testing, chat and advertising providers, and few could say who is able to change that code.

“Treat the scripts on your website as part of your supply chain. Know which ones you load, control who can change them, and set your website so the browser blocks code it hasn’t been told to expect.”

Practical checks

  • List every third-party script your websites load, including analytics, testing, chat, advertising and tag management tools, and remove any you no longer use.
  • Review who can change those scripts: the user accounts, access tokens and integrations for each platform. Require multi-factor authentication and remove access that is no longer needed.
  • Set a Content Security Policy that lists only the script sources you need and restricts where pages can send data, and turn on its reporting so you see what it blocks.
  • Take card payments through your payment provider’s hosted fields rather than your own form fields where you can.
  • Add website script providers to your third-party risk reviews, alongside your other suppliers.
  • If you use Optimizely, follow the checks in Report URI’s write-up and Optimizely’s guidance to its customers.

What this means for your organisation

Your customers increasingly expect you to show how you manage your suppliers, and the scripts on your website are part of that, as our article on what customers will ask suppliers to prove in 2027 explains. Our supply chain security monitoring and managed security services help organisations see and reduce that exposure. For other recent incidents, see our coverage of the PHP2Shell vulnerabilities and the supermarket freezer attacks, or talk to us.

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